UN Security Council Reform is UNrealistic and Unlikely
JACOB MADDAUS
United Nations (UN) reform has been seen through the lens of “pipe dream or possibility”, though certainly most agree that the organization has become stagnant on critical issues related to human rights, economic and social development, security issues, and its own internal organization. Reform is essential. Perhaps no more important issue in the UN reform debate is that of the design and role of the Security Council, one that has received much criticism – both in its structure and in its role – in recent times. After more than 60 years of existence, can this 20th century Security Council structure be adequately reformed to meet 21st century challenges?
No doubt, UN Security Council reform discussion and proposals have been a hot button issue in the realm of international politics for years – certainly “long overdue” – though through all the discussion, in actuality the issue has remained completely unchanged. Despite great changes in the distribution of power and wealth since the creation of the UN, including the dramatic rise of global GDP bringing many developing countries into the realm of importance (think: India, Brazil, South Africa), Security Council reform has been, and will continue to be, an unmovable goal in the immediate future. The Economist understates this dilemma by asserting Security Council reform “might not be easy”, but let’s be clear: changing the structure of the Security Council in the near future is completely unrealistic and nearly impossible – barring a massive global crisis or war, certainly larger than the financial collapse of 2008 – much as it has been in the past.
Security Council reform is unlikely because firstly, the United States’ seemingly indifferent attitude towards reform. Rhetorically, the US has recently argued for the inclusion of Japan and India, as well as shown support of a larger overall number of countries to be included, (perhaps to 20 or so seats overall); though rhetoric is as far as the US will go. This is in part because a change in the Security Council would need a charter amendment requiring a 2/3 vote in the General Assembly, and realistically, the General Assembly is not likely to approve such a change without a much larger inclusion of Security Council members. A larger group of members means a more complicated route in the creation of ‘blocking coalitions’ for the resolutions the US does not support, or ‘winning coalitions’ for the resolutions it does. (You could even foresee a scenario where enough developing countries block the US’s agenda – heaven forbid!) Fundamentally, it is not in the best interests of the US.
Along with disputes about the size of Security Council, in the unlikely event that the General Assembly was to agree on a size which had US backing, US officials and its allies would be concerned about the possible behavior of these new potential permanent members. Germany and Japan – two obvious candidates because of their wealth and influence – would likely act in a manner similar to the US; but India, Brazil, and South Africa (also very likely candidates and who are still developing countries), may still operate in a very outdated ideology as far as the US is concerned. Concerns with potential behavior of new permanent members are just as essential as the concern about size.
Beyond the US concerns with Security Council reform, actual proposals sent to inter-government negotiations in the General Assembly in recent years by the so-called Open-ended Working Group on UN Security Council Reform (OEWG) have been met with resistance on various levels by the major General Assembly factions. The G4 faction of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil (along with their allies) has been met with great resistance from their regional rivals, (which includes, for the most part, the members of the Uniting for Consensus Coalition): France and Italy against Germany, South Korea and Indonesia against Japan, Pakistan and increasingly China against India, and Mexico and Argentina against Brazil. The third ‘wild card’ faction is that of Africa, which seems to have highly unrealistic and lofty goals for Security Council reform, (including a minimum of 2 permanent seats which has led to their share of in-fighting) and for the foreseeable future, appears to be unwilling to change.
If by the slimmest of chances the General Assembly were to pass reform by the unlikely 2/3 majority, the next step would require Security Council permanent membership states (the P5) to domestically ratify the reform. Again, this scenario does not bode well. While France and Britain seem most ready and willing to enact reform domestically, there are no incentives for Russia and China to do so. Russia would obviously prefer to remain a key power despite the end of the Cold War, and sees no need to change the current system which places Russia among five as opposed to potentially one in ten permanent members. China’s disagreements with Japan and India are well known and documented, (especially their issue with both in the G4). That leaves the US to provide leadership in the ratification process, but if US concerns are still centered about the size and behavior of the future body, or if the domestic politics of the US has no ‘time’ or motivation to consider UN reform, (think: election year or conservative control) the chance of proactive leadership is near impossible. Perhaps the US unipolar status has past – perhaps not – but there is no question their significance and bearing in the reform process is still monumentally imperative.
Security Council reform does not have just one hurdle to clear, but multiple layers of resistance, whether it is US hesitation, complete disagreement and decent in the rest of the P5, the unlikeliness of a General Assembly negotiated reform plan AND 2/3 passage, or the difficult ratification process that would follow. It would take a figurative ‘perfect storm’ to enact real reform in the structure of the Security Council.
With road block after road block after road block in the way of real reform, it is perhaps not too far off to say that United Nations Security Council reform is less likely than pigs flying.
I agree completely with Jacob’s assertion that changing the structure of the security council is unrealistic and nearly impossible. Despite pressure from rising global powers such as India and Brazil, the US are simply not going to voluntarily dilute their power or control within the Security Council. The US as a world power has significant influence on world affairs, this is reinforced by their place on the Security Councila and their power of veto. Jacob posits that perhapsthe unipolar status of the US is waning, and perhaps it is, yet they are still the world’s most influential power. The question is not whether the UN can be reformed. The question is will the US allow any reform to take place which reduces their level of control in the UN. The answer is same answer at which Jacob arrives. That reform within the security council is about as likely as flying pigs, at least in current and forseeable future.
Unfortunatley the limited membership of the Council and the power of veto is an outdated structure and reflects and reinforces ideas of power politics. Unfortunately power politics and human rights are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Power politcs reflects realist thinking. Realism is concerned with a country’s capabilities, particularly military capabilities. This state-centric approach includes sovereignty as an unbreakable right of a country within realism. Human rights on the other hand is underpinned by ideas of universalism. A global resbonsibility that developed countries have to all individuals in all countries. Therefore the structure of the Security Council is clearly an obstacle to progression in human rights. Unfortunately this obstacle will not be altered until it is America’s interest to do so.
The Security Council’s overall competency is arguable but its greatest achievement is taken for granted; war between great-powers has been avoided since the Council’s creation. Maintaining this calm should remain as UN’s top priority as stipulated by the UN Charter’s first and foremost goal. It is thus not convincing to argue that states will block reform at all costs for age-old sovereignty hang-ups. What is latent in the Economist article is that reform has finally seeped into the UN agenda. The Council can no longer afford to fail to reflect political and economic change; it will not only lose its legitimacy, but its authority.
The above response piece implies that it is still uncertain whether U.S’ days as a superpower are over. One thing is for sure though, U.S’ moment of unilateralism has passed; U.S is no longer the “unchallenged superpower that could run roughshod over the world” (Bolton 1994: 13). U.S can only prolong its status as a great power if it can balance emerging regional hegemons through perceptive foreign policy. Offshore balancing is familiar to American strategists. Therefore, it is in U.S’ national security interest to play the India card to check China in the great-power politics scene. Not only U.S, but all countries are troubled by China’s growing military strength. This is a “perfect storm” in disguise, recognized by the U.S. Hesitation is not an option. The element of rhetoric is undoubtedly a part of U.S’ India policy; Obama is winning over Indian friends, reformists in the UN and liberal public opinion. But he would not risk ruffling feathers in the India- Pakistan (China)- U.S. nexus without considering its strategic implications. Similar concerns would speed up the ratification process if a heightened awareness is achieved. If the veto is getting in the way, it will have to be revamped.
Removing the veto altogether is highly unlikely. However diverse solutions can incentivize reform. It has been argued that the veto can become conditional on the support of other members. A best before date could be set for permanent membership. A version of EU’s Copenhagen Criteria could be created for permanent membership, that require candidates to be capable of contributing to international security constructively beyond their own borders. The list goes on.
It is hard to agree with the argument that the current economic crisis isn’t enough of a wake up call. A future “massive global war”, promises to be rather apocalyptic. No one is likely to survive to tell the story. It’s daunting to think that those in charge of running the world might be none the wiser, resist change and fail to perceive the security risks in (rising) great power exclusion. Nonetheless, exaggerated fear-mongering is unnecessary. Idealists certainly shouldn’t hope that reform will result in the eventual formation of a global government. The Council’s need for reform isn’t about “fair representation” either. After all, the organization was designed “not to bring humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell”. Hopes for UN reform are not doomed, but less words and more action is vital.
As the first priority of the United Nation’s (UN) Security Council is stipulated as “the maintenance of international peace and security” (Charter of the UN, Chapter 5, Article 23), it is perhaps unfair to categorically brand the Security Council as “remarkably ill-adapted to the times” (Weiss 2008: 1), seeing as the world has enjoyed relative peace and security since the end of the Second World War.
That said, it might be argued that the role the Security Council has played in that peace and security is inconclusive. Stability in relations between the great powers could be down to a number of reasons. Furthermore, the much-publicised depiction of the Security Council as a shouting bystander rather than a burly policeman was crystallised when it was humiliated by the United States’ total disinterest in seeking a mandate before its invasion of Iraq in 2003.
To move away from peace and security, and address the role of the Security Council on human rights issues, it is fair to doubt its moral authority when the likes of the United States, Russia and China make up three of the five permanent members. It is also fair to presume that reform is highly unlikely – particularly any reform that is likely to lead to any discernible improvement in the way human rights abuses are policed. This is simply because it would be disastrous for all three of these major powers and their interests if there were an actual effective human rights enforcer in the world that had the mandate and the ability to introduce consequences for perpetrators.
In addition, as the UN is made up of politicians who represent certain interests, it seems unlikely that there will be much appetite among them to undergo the rigorous upheaval that would be required to bring about an event that would yield limited political capital domestically. Citizens of States – by and large – are chiefly concerned with what happens on their doorsteps, and ergo those who represent them will generally seek to do likewise. Human rights abuses in another part of the world rarely capture the gaze of the international community for any more than a fleeting glance. Generally, people and politicians alike will express some outrage and a desire to see change, until that change requires them to act and forego some of their interests – and then suddenly the situation has become more complex. This is a serious stumbling block for reform of the Security Council.
Finally, in spite of the unlikelihood of reform, it is nonetheless important that it occurs. The dominance of States with poor records on human rights and a make-up that reflects a mid-twentieth century international circuit rather than a twenty-first century one is – needless to say – outdated. Any well-run organisation has safeguards in place that ensures the same tired voices are not to be heard over and over again, losing credibility and respect by the day. Well-run organisations have mechanisms in place whereby the actors who are in power are assessed at regular intervals and fingers are pointed in rather than out.
Jacob’s response to this week’s focal article argues that reforming the United Nations (UN) security council is unlikely if not impossible. He identifies US concerns for the constellation and behavior of a reformed body as the most fundamental problem in reforming the UN. While I agree with Jacob’s position, I would like to add that the ambiguous position of the US within the UN system not only hinders reform but fundamentally threatens the legitimacy and credibility of the security council to the extent that reform may be unnecessary.
As Jacob points out, an ongoing shift in the global “distribution of power and wealth since the creation of the UN” is significantly diminishing the representativeness of the security council.
Any kind of reform must be congruent with future expectations about the role of the council. If the council’s role remains the provision of peace and security, then membership of the council must be altered to fulfill these expectations. Moreover, the ambiguous position of the US within this system is problematic. The US tends to use the council as an instrument of foreign policy and only when it suits its national interests (Bolton et al. 1994). On the other hand, the UN is ultimately dependent upon US leadership (Bolton et al. 1994). Weiss (2003) sums this up neatly: “Today, there are two world “organizations”: the UN—global in membership— and the United States—global in reach and power”. Unless the structure of the council is fundamentally redefined, the council stands to lose all legitimacy.
Despite the seeming urgency of council reform, there might also be a case for the futility of any kind of reform. On the possibility regarding the use of force against Iraq, the security council clearly demonstrated its dysfunctionality. Initial disagreement within the council about an intervention in Iraq resulted in the US simply bypassing the council. Moreover, Powell’s statement that the US was not “bound by the council’s decision” evidenced the council’s lack of authority. The UN ponders between being ignored and functioning as a mere rubber stamp to US decisions (Glennon 2003). As Glennon (2003) points out, American unipolarity debilitates the council just as “bipolarity paralyzed it during the Cold War”. Bolton (1994) might thus be right in stating that “there is no such thing as the United Nations”; rather,“ there’s simply a group of member governments, who, if they have the political will, every once in a while, to protect international peace and security, they’re able to do it”. Moreover, this seems possible only under US guidance (Bolton 1994). Unless the power imbalance within the security council is rectified, the UN as a supposedly representative organisation at the global level may become obsolete.
Bibliography:
Bolton, J. et al., Global Structures Convocation, 1994, ‘Human Rights, Global
Governance and Strengthening the United Nations’.
Glennon, M., 2003. ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 3.
Weiss, T.G., 2003. “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform” in The Washington Quarterly, pp. 148-161.