What Does Wendt mean when he says that ‘anarchy is what the states make of it’?
IEVA BALTAKYTE
Alexander Wendt’s statement that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ has trembled the foundations of the neo-realists (and neo-liberals) thought based on the assumption that anarchy is a set condition of the international system that cannot be altered but only analysed to understand its effects on interactions among states. The first part of my study brief is going to be dedicated to analysing the rationale in Wendt’s allegation that states can and do shape the anarchic international structure. The author stresses on numerous instances that neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism are in agreement on a great number of points. This raises a question of what is the most contrasting feature of constructivism, as represented by Wendt, differentiating it from the former approaches. Thus, the second section is going to argue that the abandonment of materialism, an indispensable stance of the neo-realist and neoliberal traditions, constitute the most significant feature and contribution of constructivism to international relations theory. The final section asks whether security concerns can be reduced if anarchy is really ‘what states make of it’.
Wendt attacks the claim that anarchy is an unalterable structure that generates a self-help system and hostile states’ behaviour towards each other. According to him, anarchy should be viewed as an institution, a relatively stable set of interests and identities that is being constructed through multiple interactions among states, and which itself constrains and shapes these interactions, interests and identities of the participants. In other words, both structure and agents exert continual pressure on to each other determining the quality of anarchy.
Thus, an anarchy defined as a self-help system is only one of many possible states of anarchy that are possible. The self-help system is a social construction, with states seeing themselves as threatened entities, needing to compete for power, wealth, and security in order to survive. It rests on intersubjective ideas that states attach to each other and the international system and in turn are formed by interactions among the states. Wendt points out that states act differently towards “friends” and “enemies” despite the distribution of power. More cooperative anarchy can be a reality, as states start to cooperate more. Continual engagement and exchange would lead to formation of new identities, institutionalization of new norms and practices, and finally a change in structure that would award the new type of acceptable behaviour and would punish the states’ behaviour that does not reflect new norms.
Constructivism, as represented by Wendt, objects the materialistic stance of neo-liberals and in particular neo-realists who assume that states act on material needs, interests and initiatives. Military capabilities, economic wealth, raw resources, according to the former approaches, are objective indicators of power and threat. For Wendt, materialism fails to account for the patterns of friendship and rivalty among the nations despite the distribution of military capabilities. The United States view the relative increase in power in Canada and Cuba through different lenses because it interprets them differently. Canada is considered to be a friend and an ally while Cuba is viewed as a threat that has to be counteracted.
Constructivism, as illustrated above, argues that objects do not carry the meaning in themselves. The meaning is socially constructed and the interpretation depends upon shared ideas and interpretations existing at the time. Similarly, other states are not necessarily viewed as evil entities that ultimately constitute a threat to others survival. Through repeated interactions engaging states acquire identities, interests, form expectations and eventually institutionalize norms of behaviour.
Materialism could be seen as the most contrasting feature of constructivism that clearly distinguishes it from the other two approaches. Wendt agrees on the assumptions of anarchy rather than some form of authority defining international sphere, he also agrees that states are rational and act on cost-benefit analysis. In addition, Wendt, adopts a positivist epistemology, claiming that intersubjective ideas, and institutions are nevertheless objective objects that are more than just beliefs thus laws of behaviour can be found. The claim that political and international realities are the result of social construction rather than objective judgements are taken for granted is a novel assumption in the international relations theory that constructivism has successfully introduced.
Finally, what are the implications on security when the self-help system is seen as being able for transformation into more or less cooperative system? Can security, which is a major concern in the contemporary world, be shifted to the list of less pressing issues anarchy becomes a more cooperative institution?
Although Wendt does not consider this question explicitly, it seems that security would remain a central issue in international politics despite the changing qualities of anarchy. The self-help system could be transformed into individualistic security system or cooperative security system; nevertheless, it would still remains a system concerned with security. What would change is the perception of who are responsible for the security to be guaranteed. The actions of other states could be considered to have a perfectly negative relationship with one’s security, infringing ones security to some extent or, in fact, contributing to one’s security. This approach allows for different logics of anarchy where security, while remaining important, is allowed to acquire different meanings, for example, by being associated with collective action, rather than rivalty or individualism.
To conclude, this study brief was designed to answer three separate questions. Firstly, what did Wendt meant by ‘anarchy is what states make of it?’ Secondly, what is the most contrasting characteristic of constructivist approach, to which I responded that the idea of social construction being an alternative to materialism has been the most prominent contrasting feature of this approach. Finally, I tried to deduce what would be the implications on security concerns held by nations, when there is a possibility for the face of anarchy to be altered. I concluded that, according to Wendt, if the quality of anarchy changes from less to more cooperative, security would gain a different intersubjective meaning, with different norms of action of maintaining it.
This piece is remarkably comprehensive in regard to its exploration and analysis of Wendt’s theory on constructivism and especially the role of anarchy in the global system. Indeed the writer avoids any normative actions when speaking on the theoretical level but does express an interesting opinion in regard to the security implications of Wendt’s approach. Wendt’s focus on the social interactions and behaviours of states is interesting, although I cannot agree with his view that the value and ‘meaning’ of material resources and possessions vary depending on the social relationship of states with one another. That is to say I don’t believe that social interactions have such a significant role in determining state actions on the theoretical level. But it would not be unreasonable to say that social interactions do play a part in defining state interactions at critical moments, especially in relation to security. It seems to me that the writer believes that should states exist in a system where material resources and defensive military applications are used based on individual states’ interactions and then that system would be less secure than one based on mutual distrust and suspicion. Indeed I agree that the actions of states has a significant effect on their mutual security dilemmas but that it is only significant when those states are of equal strength, power and resources. You cannot expect, for example, the United States to assume the same defensive posturing with Ghana as with China. In any case the study brief is well written and shows good use of theory craft and practical examples.
I agree with Isaac that this piece is extensive and comprehensive in explaining Wendt’s viewpoint with regards to the fundamental structure of anarchy. I find that Wendt’s writing itself is, as Krasner points out in his piece “Wars, hotel fires and plane crashes” reflective of a more Lockean as opposed to Hobbesian view of state interaction. That is to say that “states see eachother as rivals as opposed to enemies” (Krasner, 2000: 135). This viewpoint may indeed hold in specific situations but it is the motivation of normative values with which I must take issue. Apart from the empirical issue of measuring what exactly a ‘norm’ is, let alone the extent to which such a value might influence political interactions, it is the comparison of material motivation with these perceived endemic value systems that appear to devalue the constructivist theory. I must agree with Krasner in arguing that though norms may exist to steer some states in some situations, these norms are weak and often overpowered by more constraining material threats. The obvious example of this is nuclear weapons, which is evident in the interaction between the USA and Iran. Whether these states are motivated by desire for deterrence or are locked in a security dilemma, it is certain that weak normative ideals of ‘liberté, égalité et fraternité’ or even appropriateness, so often embodied by the USA domestically, are overridden by the fear of attack and certain destruction. In spite of little to no evidence of an attempt by Iran to build a WMA, the USA continues posturing and threatening with Iran also doing its best to be perceived as a state to be reckoned with. This in itself could be used as an argument for anarchy as an unalterable structure. Perhaps the converse could be argued that if actors were aware of their ability to make what they can of anarchy such issues of security and deterrence would be less significant. I am however, extremely skeptical of this given the logic of Thucydides which has remained enduring for thousands of years; “The strong do as the like and the weak suffer what they must”.
Wendt makes an important point that Stephanie alludes to when she mentions states seeing each other as rivals not enemies, but he goes even further to suggest that some states don’t see each other as anything at all, other than existent land masses with populations. Materially weak countries most likely fall into the category of not having enough interaction to form enmity or great bonds of friendship. Wendt argues that powerful states do not conquer weaker states because they have no resources to offer, but also because they recognize sovereignty of these states. There is little interaction and states are left alone. Are states left alone though, are any states left to manage their affairs without the advice and insistence of others? Here I think that Krasner has a very powerful point on the interference of states in the national business of others. The business of human rights especially, hundreds of international organizations have been set up in more powerful countries where there are resources to promote human and animal rights in less developed countries. There are programs across the globe to westernize and influence teaching practices and customs to others, maybe this is not an aggressive military invasion of another country’s policy, but it certainly does not support Wendt’s argument that states mutually recognize each other as sovereigns.
I agree that this is a comprehensive and well written peace but I have to disagree with both Ieva and Wendt in several of their claims. Wendt seems to humanise the state talking about ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ and while it may make sense to humanise the state seeing as it is a man-made conception, I don’t think states follow the norms of behaviour that it’s populations might follow themselves and I feel his idea of states being ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ is oversimplified.
To say that states treat their friends and enemies differently because their enemies are threatening and their friends are not, you have to look further into why they are friends and enemies. Wendt cites Canada and Cuba and talks of ‘intersubjective understandings and expectations’ and ‘distribution of knowledge’. Let’s be real here, Cuba is Communist and therefore is an enemy for ideological reasons but is it a threat to their power and security? And Vietnam et al? The underlying reason is that the US was unable to impose neoliberal policies in a Communist country which would benefit US corporations and the US economy, as they did all over Latin America after World War II, so it’s not so much about security and power threats per se, but more about threats to US economic interests. It is very costly now to invade countries so alot can be gained from weaker countries by destablilising them and installing a government that will run it in ways that benefit the strong. Canada is a proponent of free-market capitalism and shares the same economic values as the US, therefore it is a friend. As such, I disagree with Wendt and Ieva claiming ‘materialism fails to account for the patterns of friendship and rivalry among the nations despite the distribution of military capabilities’.
My main contention overall, is that Wendt and Ivea’s argument is based on the idea that ‘meaning is socially constructed and the interpretation depends upon shared ideas and interpretations existing at the time.’ It is of my opinion that while this may be true on a social level, this doesn’t filter through to where the power is and therefore, the decision-making centre of the state is. Furthermore, I feel they both put too much emphasis on the idea of ‘threats to security’ and how states misinterpret others actions with regard to this, when there is more at work in the decision-making of states.
This piece is a well-articulated analysis of Wendt’s paper “Anarchy is what states make of it”. It clearly outlines Wendt’s premise that anarchy is not static and that various degrees of anarchy exist depending on socialization process of states at different times and places. Varying do exist at different periods in time. For instance the creation and evolution of the supranational institution that is the EU has increased levels of cooperation between European countries as trust grows and egoism declines through continuous interactions. Therefore anarchy is not the sole determinant of interaction between states. States are subject to formal and informal constraints. While Wendt does offer a compelling argument I agree with Stephanies ‘ it is the comparison of material motivation with these perceived endemic value systems that appear to devalue the constructivist theory.’ Norms that are widely held and institutionalized for example Genocide are not followed or rather can be avoided when the action will be costly. For example in Rwanda in 1994 reports emerged from the UN that systematic killings were taking place. The situation met the criteria needed to classify the situation as Genocide. Despite the international community responsibility to intervene in supreme humanitarian emergencies they did not. Particularly the United States did not intervene because they saw any mission in Rwanda as too costly as a result of their disastrous mission in Somalia. Therefore materialism remains important as an explanatory force. The welfare and survival of one’s own state is the most important factor for states.