According to Stephen Walt, what is the security dilemma posed by Iran and the appropriate response?
PATRICK SMITH
According to Stephen Walt the security dilemma to the USA posed by Iranian Nuclear aspirations is frequently over-stated by neo conservatives and the “pro war party”. Walt is, however, careful to acknowledge in his “How not to contain Iran” that it is still a threat which must be dealt with seriously.
In the first part of the aforementioned March 2010 piece Walt takes issue with the works of traditional centrists Lindsay and Takeyh, who he accuses of buying into the scaremongering of those in favour of war, just as happened to allow the USA’s action in Iraq several years ago. Lindsay and Takeyh prescribe that the USA must draw three lines in the sand, “1) no initiation of conventional warfare, 2) no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material, or technologies, and 3) no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities”- and must punish the breaking of these rules by any and all means necessary, presumably by military action. This is an entirely unrealistic course of action, according to Walt as point 2 is not an option to Iran as the country is still some way from developing a nuclear weapon, and if it were to it would have nothing to gain by sharing its technology with other rogue states, and would endanger itself by sharing with terrorist organisations. Subversive activities have never been a cause for war for the USA, even in the pressure cooker environment at the height of the cold war.
What Walt is really criticising is the traditional realist approach to international security. A view that, to paraphrase the cliché, one must prepare for war in order to maintain peace. The aggression of this stance by the USA would only serve to increase the gains to Iran in acquiring functional Nuclear weapons. They would believe this to be an affront by the USA and Nuclear weapons would be their way of scaring the US into not beginning military intervention.
Stephen Waltz offers briefly his own plan of action to face Iran in the second part of the article. Waltz calls this “the one approach that might actually have some small chance of heading off an Iranian bomb”. By taking all threats of war and enforced regime change off the table for the time being, and offering instead a “grand bargain” of sorts to the Iranians. This “grand bargain” would entail allowing Iran to continue its uranium enrichment programme on condition that it accept the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty’s additional protocol and implements all its conditions (mainly to do with transparency and co-operation with international nuclear weapons inspectors). In return America would engage with the Iranians about security issues in the gulf, guaranteeing not to instigate regime change. The idea behind this is to offer greater mutual gains to both nations, and to avoid war (the most costly solution) at all costs.
The article is a fascinating illustration of the differences between E H Carr’s realism and the later neo realist approach to International Relations.
A realist would scoff at the idea that such a treaty as the NPT, could stop Iran from acquiring the bomb to brandish in its desire to become the dominant power among its neighbours in the Gulf. Similarly a realist would believe that guarantees from the Americans not to instigate regime change would hold no water in terms of credibility with the Iranians.
Walt’s point is that the driving force of survival, rather than human nature’s quest for more power is what will allow for Iran’s acceptance of the grand bargain. This is in agreement with Walt’s predecessor Kenneth Waltz’s writings, such as “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” from which Walt draws much influence. Although the international system remains in essence in a state of anarchy, there is no belief “that man’s innate lust for power constitutes sufficient cause for war in the absence of any other” (Waltz).
Personally I am not convinced that Walt’s strategy is the best path to go down. For one thing, which is completely overlooked by Realist and Neo Realist theory, the ideological differences between the two states would, I believe make it next to impossible for the USA to engage in the aforementioned discussions with the Iranian leadership. The theory which Walt discusses takes states as the only actors, however in practice there would be outrage among political elite and the media were President Obama to engage in discourse treating a “rogue state” such as Iran as equal. I feel with a presidential election in the pipeline this would be disastrous for Obama politically and would not, therefor be a realistic approach to take. His Critics would slate him for showing such weakness on the world stage.